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9 Nov 89

FROM: John J. O'Donnell  
NIO/NESA

7E48 OHB

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SUBJECT: SNIE 37-89 Afghanistan: The War in PerspectiveCLASSIFICATION: SECRET NOFORN

PAGES

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NSA	William Nolte SINIO/NESA, G-9	963-1549	7A144
DIAC	<div></div> DIA/DE-4	373-4521	B-6963 STAT
Pentagon	<div></div> DIA/DIO/ME	695-0198	2A520 STAT
State	Eliza Van Hollen INR/NESA/SOA	647-8574	4634
	<i>cc - Bill Jones</i>		
	<i>Immediate !</i>		

REMARKS:*Please Return*

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
NIC#01148-89  
8 November 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board  
Representatives

FROM: John J. O'Donnell  
National Intelligence Officer  
for Near East and South Asia

SUBJECT: Special National Intelligence Estimate  
37-89: AFGHANISTAN: THE WAR IN  
PERSPECTIVE

The attached revised Terms of Reference (TOR) reflects community comments and formal input to the draft TOR submitted for coordination on 6 November 1989. Changes are underlined for easy reference. Community representatives are requested to bring to the 15/16 November coordination meetings alternate text for those areas considered contentious and a substantive drafter to facilitate rewrites. Please note the minor schedule changes.

  
John J. O'Donnell

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NIC # 01143-89  
6 November 1989MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board  
RepresentativesFROM: John J. O'Donnell  
National Intelligence Officer  
for Near East and South AsiaSUBJECT: Special National Intelligence Estimate  
37-89: AFGHANISTAN: THE WAR IN  
PERSPECTIVE

1. The attached Concept Paper and Terms of Reference are forwarded for coordination. Please submit your comments by close of business on 7 November.

2. The following timetable is in effect for this SNIE:

13 November - Draft completion/FAX'd to community  
15 November - Community coordination meeting  
0900-1600, Rm 7E62 OHB  
16 November - "If necessary" coordination meeting  
1015-1215, Rm 7E62 OHB  
17 November - NLT 1000, final telephonic input;  
coordination completed.  
20 November - 1600, NFIB presentation.

3. Please ensure all names and clearances for the coordination meetings are forwarded  no later than 1200 14 November 1989.

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/s/  
John J. O'Donnell

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SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 37-89:  
AFGHANISTAN: THE WAR IN PERSPECTIVE

Terms of Reference-Concept Paper

The unexpected success of the Soviet backed Kabul regime can be attributed to Moscow's continued high level of materiel support, lack of resistance cohesiveness and progress on the battlefield, as well as general disarray and ineffectiveness of the Afghan Interim Government (AIG). Soviet support has been manifest in a massive resupply effort, including nearly 4500 aircraft sorties and overland crossborder convoys since Moscow's February 1989 withdrawal. The resistance's unsuccessful efforts to take key regime strongholds--such as Jalalabad--and to significantly disrupt resupply of regime forces, combined with a failure to maintain constant pressure on the regime throughout the country, strongly suggest the resistance is unable to win the war quickly. Politically, the AIG has failed to expand its appeal or effectiveness.

These developments suggest a community re-evaluation is in order. SNIE 37-89 will provide the US policymaker with judgments on prospects for resistance or regime gains over the next 6-12 months. It will examine the current and future military situation, the insurgent political process, Soviet resolve to continue regime support, and the effect of the war on regional players.

Length	10 pages (excluding key judgments, boxes, and graphics)
Classification	S <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 220px; height: 20px; vertical-align: middle;"></span>
Principal Drafter	Eliza Van Hollen, State/INR
Expected Pub.	Week of 20 November 1989

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### Key Questions

I. How should we characterize the present military situation and, assuming present forces and trends remain relatively constant, what developments might we expect over the next twelve months?

II. How does the political process interact with the military and what are the prospects over the next year for strengthening the Afghan Interim Government?

III. How soon and in what ways might continued instability in Afghanistan influence political events in Pakistan?

IV. How does the Soviet Union view the continued conflict in Afghanistan and what developments in the next year could alter the present Soviet position?

V. What are the implications for US interests of the continuing conflict in Afghanistan?

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## Outline

I. How should we characterize the present military situation and, assuming present trends continue, what developments might we expect over the next twelve months? (military, economic, etc.)

A. What are the important strengths and weaknesses of the respective parties?

B. What regime vulnerabilities could either side exploit to shorten the war?

C. What seem to be the programs, priorities and approximate timetables of the more important mujahedin commanders?

D. What would be the effect on each side from a cut-off of outside assistance? What are the prospects for a continuing adequate flow of supplies? Will the possible shortage of key materiel constitute a significant factor impeding mujahedin military progress?

E. What do we understand of mujahedin plans for the winter?

II. How does the insurgent political process interact with the military and what are prospects over the next year for a more effective resistance government?

A. What should be our expectations of the Afghan Interim Government?

B. What are the attitudes of major mujahedin commanders toward the AIG?

C. Is there an alternative political scenario? (e.g., the inclusion of former King Zahir Shah?)

D. What will be the effect on the conflict of continuing AIG weakness?

III. How soon and in what ways might continued instability in Afghanistan influence political events in Pakistan?

A. How will Pakistan's relationship with the Afghan insurgency develop over the next year?

B. How dependent is Pakistan's present policy on support from the US?

C. How would a successful opposition move against the Bhutto government affect Pakistan's Afghan policy?

D. Are there any strains within the present Pakistani government over Afghan policy?

IV. How does the Soviet Union view the continued conflict in Afghanistan and what developments in the next year could alter this Soviet position?

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A. What are probable parameters of the Soviet position in any international negotiations?

B. Under what circumstances might the Soviets diminish their present high levels of support for the current regime?

C. What Soviet initiatives, either political or military, might we expect in the next year?

D. Examine Soviet views of negative symmetry.

V. How will the positions of other outside players develop, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran?

A. What are Saudi interests and priorities?

B. What changes might we anticipate in the Saudi position over the next year?

C. How does Saudi-Iranian rivalry affect the war and what should we expect over the next twelve months?

D. Should we expect closer Iranian-Soviet cooperation?

E. Should we anticipate an expanded propaganda or disinformation campaign to discredit and fragment the mujahedin, particularly in order to undermine foreign (i.e., American) support levels?

F. Are the Soviets likely to increase efforts to subvert individual mujahedin commanders and their followers, either through the Kabul government or Soviet correligionists?

VI. What are the implications for US regional interests of the continuing Afghan conflict?

A. How would US interests be affected by the survival of the current regime?

B. How do states in the region view the present US policy?

C. What do the Afghan insurgents expect of the US over the next twelve months?

D. What would be the impact on US interests of negative symmetry?

VII. What plausible alternate scenarios could we expect to see?

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